Take me out to the Ball Game? The Effect of Crime on Major League Baseball Game Attendance by Jakubek, Allison
Undergraduate Economic Review
Volume 14 | Issue 1 Article 2
2017
Take me out to the Ball Game? The Effect of Crime
on Major League Baseball Game Attendance
Allison Jakubek
University of Mary Washington, alli.jakubek@gmail.com
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Jakubek, Allison (2017) "Take me out to the Ball Game? The Effect of Crime on Major League Baseball Game
Attendance," Undergraduate Economic Review: Vol. 14 : Iss. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol14/iss1/2
Take me out to the Ball Game? The Effect of Crime on Major League
Baseball Game Attendance
Abstract
Major League Baseball attendance has been examined since the league’s establishment in 1869. Winning
percentage, opponent quality, and stadium quality have all been deemed significant determinants of increasing
attendance, but deterring factors have yet to be closely examined. Since a majority of professional sports
stadiums are constructed in economically poor, crime ridden areas, it seems natural to assume that crime
could have an impact on people’s desire to attend Major League Baseball games. Panel data collected on
twenty-eight teams over the course of ten years was used to determine whether or not crime rates have a
significant effect on attendance.
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I.  INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
On April 25, 2015, in the interest of public safety, The Baltimore Orioles closed the gates 
of Camden Yards, leaving the Orioles and Chicago White Sox to play America’s pastime in an 
empty stadium. Until the Baltimore riots of 2015, there was nothing that could hinder a willing 
and able fan from attending a Major League Baseball game. This occurrence sparked interest in 
the idea that crime could deter fans from wanting to attend sporting events, specifically, Major 
League Baseball games. Through this study, I hope to uncover the hidden costs of crime—like 
missing fans at baseball games. 
The factors that go into choosing whether or not to attend a Major League Baseball 
game—and the structure of Major League Baseball itself—are relatively consistent from team to 
team, but these consistencies come with a decent amount of complexity. Regardless of fan 
turnout, the ultimate goal of Major League Baseball owners and managers is to make a profit. 
They rely on fan loyalty (Winfree 2004) and the idea that pricing for Major League Baseball 
games is relatively inelastic (Winfree 2004). Fan loyalty is the backbone of Major League 
Baseball. Teams can typically rely on consistently filling at least a quarter of their seats despite 
how well or poorly they perform. 
 Performance is also a key factor in determining the demand for Major League Baseball 
tickets. If you play well, they will come (Horowitz 2007). A fan’s reaction to his team winning 
or losing varies throughout the league (Davis 2009) but winning is always a strong determinant 
of attendance (Davis 2009). Some variations exist among this assumption, including who the 
opponent will be (Winfree 2004) and outcome uncertainty (Ahn and Lee 2014). The closer in 
location two teams are, the lower the demand is for tickets (Winfree 2004). Interleague play 
tends to bring in an additional 12% of fans to the stadiums, thanks to increased media coverage 
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and well-known rivalries (Davis 2009). That being said, the more likely a team is to win a game, 
whether it be interleague or not, the more fans it attracts (Ahn and Lee 2014). 
 When attempting to discern whether or not crime rates have an effect on Major League 
Baseball attendance, it is important to look at the location of the stadiums. A majority of Major 
League Baseball stadiums are built in economically poor cities, with a false hope that a 
professional sports stadium will generate revenue and growth for the surrounding area (Abraham 
2006). Since the 1990s, crime rates in cities have been continuously declining, (Ellen and 
O’Reagan 2010) which is largely due to urban flight—or the movement of people living in cities 
to the suburbs. The relationship between sporting events and crime has been studied, but has 
shown little to no evidence that there is a relationship between the two (Braumann, Ciavarra, 
Englehardt, and Matheson 2012). Previously examined were the Olympics hosts, which 
experienced a 10% increase in property crime, and Super Bowl hosts, which experienced a 2.5% 
decrease in property crime (Braumann, Ciavarra, Englehardt, and Matheson 2012). I expect the 
results of this study to be different than the Olympics and the Super Bowl, because I am using 
evidence from an entire season rather than one major sporting event. It is possible to assume that 
large events like the Olympics and the Super Bowl have substantial amounts of security to 
ensure the safety of all patrons—more so than the security provided at smaller events—such as 
regular season Major League Baseball games. The increased security at events like the Olympics 
and Super Bowl could deter certain crime that is typically present at centralized events that occur 
in the same area, like the crime seen in the cities of Major League Baseball teams. 
 Through this study I will keep all of these determinants in mind while examining the 
extent to which crime affects Major League Baseball game attendance. Though questions about 
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crime in urban areas and the location of sports stadiums have been answered, I seek to uncover 
the relationship between the two. 
II.  ECONOMIC THEORY  
A simple supply and demand model, as shown in Figure 1, can demonstrate the 
relationship between Major League baseball game attendance and crime rates. 
FIGURE 1. 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND  










 To the extent that crime rates influence people’s decision to attend Major League 
Baseball games, I expect the demand for tickets to decrease as crime rate increases.  
The dependent variable of this study is attendance, which is represented as a percentage 
of seats that are filled of the total available seats in each ballpark. Some ballparks fill over 
capacity, possibly by selling standing room-only tickets, which is an explanation for the 
Price of 
ticket 
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percentages that are over 100%. The main explanatory variable is the crime rate in each city, 
which is represented as a composite number with weight placed on violent crime such as 
homicide and assault, as reported by Advamed, Inc. One must keep in mind that the average 
crime rate in the United States is 294.7 (Advameg Inc. 2015). It could be the case that Major 
League baseball stadiums are built in economically poor areas, but the presence of a professional 
sports stadium stimulating the economy of that area. This could be because the crime in these 
neighborhoods is deterring fans from coming to games. I expect this coefficient to be negative. 
As crime index increases, I expect attendance to decrease. Crime can be represented as a 
negative externality to someone attending a baseball game—thus increasing the social cost of 
attending a game. This cost is reflected at every quantity of tickets demanded, which in turn 
shifts the demand curve to the left—decreasing the price of tickets and quantity of tickets 
demanded.  
Major League Baseball game attendance varies widely from team to team and year-to-
year—and the reasoning behind choosing to attend a game is based on a multitude of factors.  A 
team’s performance is an obvious assumption—fans are more willing to pay to attend a baseball 
game for the assurance of a higher quality of play and a positive crowd atmosphere.  The 
assumption holds true that “fans prefer to watch good teams play, regardless of their uniforms” 
(Horowitz 94). I expect this coefficient to be positive. As winning percentage increases, I expect 
attendance to increase.  A division win and a World Series win could be an important 
determinants of attendance. It could be that if a team wins their division or the World Series the 
year prior, they would have increased attendance at the following year’s games due to expected 
wins that season. I expect both coefficients to be positive. 
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The actual price of a ticket is another factor that could either encourage or discourage 
people from attending a game. The lower the price of a Major League Baseball ticket, one would 
assume, the more attractive attending a game becomes to marginal fans. If the price of a ticket is 
high, the opposite effect would take place. This assumption only holds for the portion of ticket 
pricing that is elastic, or, to put it in more relevant terms, for the marginal fans, because there is 
“substantial evidence in favor of demand [of Major League Baseball tickets] being highly price 
inelastic” (Fort 89). I expect this coefficient to be negative. As ticket price increases, I expect 
attendance to decrease. 
The average statewide income could be an important determinant of the demand for 
Major League Baseball tickets. Though the demand for baseball tickets is relatively inelastic, it 
can be assumed that there would be lower attendance for Major League Baseball games in states 
with lower average incomes than in states with higher average incomes.  I expect this coefficient 
to be positive. As state income increases, I expect attendance to increase. 
Another variable included is the number of additional sports team in the given city. There 
could be a comparative factor among professional sports leagues. A city with both a Major 
League Baseball team and a National Football League Team may experience varying levels of 
competition for attendance based on the “product” of a game experience that they are able to 
offer fans. Therefore, it could be possible that the presence of another professional sports 
stadium could decrease demand for Major League Baseball tickets due to substitution. I expect 
this coefficient to be negative. As the number of professional sports teams in a city increases, I 
expect attendance to decrease. 
The Major League Baseball industry is extremely profit oriented. Team owners are 
always looking for ways to make money off of their players and the people who come to watch 
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them play. There’s a reason why people pay $8 for a hot dog when attending a game; and it’s the 
same reason why many teams don’t have the same first baseman for more than 5 years: money. 
Cities with high crime rates tend to be struggling economically, or could have a high level of low 
wage labor, or general unemployment (Abraham 2006). Having a Major League Baseball 
stadium—or any professional sports stadium in an area with high crime makes economic sense. 
Bring the people with money to impoverished areas to stimulate the economy—sounds like an 
easy fix, but unfortunately, it does not seem to have an effect. Despite the 1990s drop in crime 
across the country, cities with high crime rates tend to stay that way (Ellen and O’Reagan 2010), 
whether they have a Major League Baseball stadium or not. It could quite possibly be crime 
itself that is deterring willing and able fans from spending money at a ballpark in an 
economically poor area. 
To accurately estimate the impact of crime on baseball attendance it is necessary to control 
for the other variables that influence demand. I am using a fixed effects model because I believe 
there are immeasurable differences between cities. 
 
III.  METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS  
To accurately estimate the impact of crime on baseball attendance it is necessary to 
control for the other variables that influence demand. I am using a fixed effects model because I 
believe there are immeasurable differences between cities. 
The model I will be using is as follows: 
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Ln (Attendance) i  = α –  βCrime Rate i  + γ1Stadium Capacity i  + γ2Winning 
Percentage i  + γ3Average Ticket Price i+ γ4Lagged World Series Win i+ γ5Lagged 
Division Series Win i  + γ6Num Additional Teams i   
+ γ7Average Income i  +FE+ ε i  
 
The teams included in my dataset include all Major League Baseball teams except for the 
Toronto Blue Jays, Washington Nationals, Detroit Tigers, and the Minnesota Twins, due to lack 
of available information. I retrieved winnings data from mlb.com, ticket pricing from The 
Business of Baseball, crime indices from Advameg, Inc., and demographical data from the US 
Census. An overview of the measurable, numerical data collected is shown in the table below. 
T A B L E  2 .  S U M M A R Y  S T A T I S T I C S  
 Mean Standard Deviation  Min Max 
Crime Index 598.66 220.13 225 1335.3 
Winning Percentage .49 .07 .30 .70 
Average Ticket Price 22.39 8.14 11.79 52.32 
State Income (1000s of dollars) 38.02 13.46 36.42 65.63 
Attendance (% of seats filled) 69.21 18.45 23.6 104 
N = 260     
     
The table shows that the crime index for each city being studied is highly varied, which is 
expected. Not shown in the table, but notable, is the number of cities that were at some point 
below the national crime index. Only four of the twenty-six cities, Anaheim, California, San 
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Diego, California, Los Angeles, California, and New York City, New York, had a crime index 
that was at one point below the national average. Also notable is the average crime index, which 
is about three hundred points higher than the national average. This helps to solidify the 
assumption that a majority of Major League Baseball stadiums are built in economically poor, 
crime-ridden areas—which could be a factor in deterring fans from attending games. The 
percentage of seats filled is another variable with a considerable sized standard deviation. The 
percentage ranges from 23.6% to 104%, with the average calculated as 69.21%. Because the 
lowest percentage shows almost a quarter of the seats in a stadium being filled, it solidifies the 
claim that there is always some demand for Major League Baseball tickets. The other variables 
have relatively similar and normal-sized standard deviations. The standard deviation of the 
winning percentages is fairly small, but the range of the data is only 40% or, as shown in the 
table, 0.4.  
With these statistics in mind, I will estimate my model. In order to properly estimate my 
model, I ran a variety of tests. Since I am working with panel data, I found it appropriate to use 
either a fixed effects or a random effects regression. In order to determine the proper 
specification, I used a Hausman test. My p-value was .0115, which allowed me to reject the null 
hypothesis and confirm that using fixed effects would be better than random effects in my model. 
After this test, I tested the parameters of my equations to see if a fixed effects model would even 
be necessary. According to my F-value of .7898, I reject the null hypothesis and conclude that a 
fixed effects estimation is not necessary for my model. Thus, I estimate my model using 
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T A B L E  3 .  R E G R E S S I O N  R E S U L T S  
Intercept 3.13 
(.021) 
Crime Index -0.0001 
(0.0002)*** 
Winning Percentage 0.016 
(0.0002)** 
Average Ticket Price -0.013 
(0.0005)*** 
Additional Teams -0.0305 
(0.0166)* 
Lagged World Series -0.011 
(0.012) 










Note: Standard Errors in parentheses 
* Denotes significance at the 90% confidence level. 
** Denotes significance at the 95% confidence level. 
***Denotes significance at the 99% confidence level. 
 
 
From a dataset of twenty-six major league baseball teams and their respective cities, I 
regress each city’s crime index along with all of the other control variables to test its effect on 
each team’s respective attendance.  The results are shown in Table 3. 
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The R2 is high at .98, which is due to the fact that this model contains a times series 
variable, response variable, and a predictor variable that all have significant trends over time and 
across entities. Four variables in this study came back statistically significant: crime index, 
winning percentage, average ticket price, and additional teams in the same city. 
Crime index is important to note, considering it is the main variable in this study. The 
negative (-0.0001) coefficient indicates that for every 1-point increase in crime, Major League 
Baseball game attendance decreases by 0.01%. The high standard deviation of the crime index 
indicates that this is significant both statistically and economically. Over the course of ten years, 
the crime rate in a city with a Major League Baseball team tends to fluctuate, on average, 220.13 
points. If this trend is entirely positive over the course of ten years, it could mean that Major 
League Baseball teams are losing .01 of their game attendance each year, which averages out to 
about 7,700 fans lost each year, if there is an increase of 220.13 points in one year. To make 
things more realistic, we can divide the standard deviation of crime by 10, which equates to a 
change of 22.013 points per year in the crime index. This would mean a loss of 770 fans per 
year, and a total of 7,700 fans over the course of 10 years. When multiplied by the average ticket 
price of $22.39, teams are losing $17,240 in ticket prices alone per year.  Considering the 
average fluctuation in the crime rate over the course of ten years, this loss could amount to 
$1,724,030. This cost is not factoring in the Fan Cost Index, which accounts for the purchases of 
concessions and souvenirs at ballparks. With those aspects factored in, the losses would likely 
double or triple. 
Winning percentage, not surprisingly, came back as statistically significant. With a 
relatively large coefficient of 0.016, it shows how great of an impact winning percentage has on 
game attendance. This coefficient indicated that for every point increase in a team’s winning 
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percentage, attendance increases by 1.6%.  This suggests that if a team’s winning percentage 
increases from .490 to .500 in a year, the attendance for that team would increase by about 560 
fans. The more a team improves, the more fans it will attract. As mentioned in the literature 
review, winning percentage is a large determinant of demand for Major League Baseball tickets. 
Fans are more willing to pay for higher quality of play, which explains the positive correlation 
between winning percentage and attendance. 
As a consequence of the demand for Major League Baseball tickets being considered 
inelastic, ticket price was an unexpected significant determinant. The coefficient for ticket price 
was negative, as expected at -0.013. This indicates that for every $1 increase in a team’s average 
ticket price, attendance decreases by 1.3%. The standard deviation of average ticket price is 
moderate at 8.17, so it can be assumed that this effect applies to most teams in a similar way. 
This coefficient suggests that for a dollar increase in ticket price, a Major League Baseball team 
could see a drop in attendance of 455 fans. 
The final significant variable was the number of additional professional sports teams in 
the same city as a Major League Baseball team. This variable was only significant at the 90% 
level, but is still important to discuss. The negative coefficient of   -0.0305 indicates that for each 
additional professional sports team in the same city as a Major League Baseball team, attendance 
tends to decrease by 3.5%. This could be due to conflicts of interest and overlapping schedules. 
If a team has a National Hockey League or a National Basketball Association team, for example, 
the beginning of Major League Baseball season coincides with the playoff season of both other 
leagues, this decreasing the attendance of Major League Baseball games. 
Though crime index was significant, the coefficient was extremely small. I was interested 
to see what the effect would be specifically for cities with high crime. To calculate what a “high” 
11
Jakubek: The Effect of Crime on Major League Baseball Game Attendance
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2017
crime rate would be, I drew from the average crime rate for cities with a Major League Baseball 
team. This average was 598.66, so I simply rounded that index to 600 points and made that the 
baseline for being considered a city with “high crime.” The high crime variable is a dummy 
variable that is represented by a 1 if the city has a crime index at some point above 600 points, 
and a 0 if it does not. My updated model is as follows: 
 
Ln (Attendance) i  = α –  βCrime Rate i  + γ1Stadium Capacity i  + γ2Winning 
Percentage i  + γ3Average Ticket Price i+ γ4Lagged World Series Win i+ γ5Lagged 
Division Series Win i  + γ6Num Additional Teams i   
+ γ7Average Income i  + γ8High Crime i  + ε i  
 
The results with this added variable are shown below. I expect the high crime coefficient 
to be negative and more economically significant than the crime index variable. 
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T A B L E  4 .  R E G R E S S I O N  R E S U L T S  
Intercept 3.13 
(.021) 
Crime Index -0.00008 
(0.00002)*** 
Winning Percentage 0.016 
(0.0002)*** 
Average Ticket Price -0.001 
(0.0005)*** 
Additional Teams -0.0305 
(0.0163)* 
Lagged World Series -0.011 
(0.012) 












Note Standard Errors in parentheses 
* Denotes significance at the 90% confidence level. 
** Denotes significance at the 95% confidence level. 
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The inclusion of the high crime variable caused important and promising changes in the 
regression results. Winning percentage became statistically significant at the 99% confidence 
level, and the high crime coefficient was statistically and economically significant at the 99% 
confidence level. The negative -0.027 coefficient on the high crime variable indicates that for 
every 1-point increase in the crime index, Major League Baseball game attendance decreases by 
-2.7%. This coefficient is over one thousand times larger than the crime index coefficient for all 
cities. This indicates that cities with high crime are more prone to losing fans at Major League 
Baseball games. Economically, the coefficient calculates to a loss of about 945 fans for every 
one-point increase in the crime index, using the average game attendance of 35,000. When 
multiplied by the average ticket price, over 10 years, teams in cities with a crime rate over 600 
could be experiencing a loss of $211,585 over the course of 10 years. This dollar amount, 
however, is only for an increase of one a point in the crime index. If the index were change at the 
amount of the standard deviation of total crime index, which is 220.13 points, the dollar amount 
lost would be significantly higher over the course of 10 years at $12,575,605. Considering the 
fact that the average salary for a Major League Baseball player is 4,250,000, this loss could be 
detrimental to the profits and signing abilities of Major League Baseball teams located in areas 
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VI.  CONCLUSION  
Although the coefficient for crime index was fairly small and the economic impact was 
slight, the statistical significance of that variable gives ground to assume that crime can be 
classified as a negative externality that causes deterrence to those who are willing and able to 
attend Major League Baseball games. The inclusion of the high crime variable proved to be eye 
opening in this model. The coefficient for high crime was over one thousand times larger than 
the coefficient of crime index as an aggregate among all teams, indicating that teams in cities 
with higher crime are more susceptible to experiencing losses in attendance as the crime index of 
their particular city increases. 
The correlation between crime index and attendance seems promising, but it is important 
to note how people view Major League Baseball stadiums, or even sports venues in general. 
Although many of today’s Major League Baseball stadiums are constructed in economically poor 
areas, fans do not necessarily get to experience the negative effects of these places. In fact, some 
of the cities studied are so large; it is highly unlikely that the average fan will even get remotely 
close to these areas of high crime. Professional sports stadiums could be seen as a “safe place” 
for people attending games in crime ridden areas. Going to a sports event could be a way for 
people to experience a city without having to worry about being the victim of a crime, thus 
keeping the effect of crime as a negative externality on the demand for Major League Baseball 
tickets relatively moderate.  
Ideally, the experiment would have been more precise if I had found even more specific 
crime indices. I was able to separate the crime data for the research by police jurisdictions, but 
even so there was overlap for teams in the same city. This would have eliminated the additional 
points on the crime index that come along with using the crime data of an entire city. I would 
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also like to find a larger number of variables to help more accurately explain fluctuations in 
Major League Baseball game attendance. Many models in previous literature have upwards of 30 
independent variables, which is a number I will strive for when I expand upon this research. 
For future research, I would suggest a larger data set, perhaps including other leagues of 
sports teams, such as The National Football League or National Hockey League. This would 
expand the number of cities being researched, and allow a researcher to see if the negative 
externality of crime is constant across different professional sports leagues.  
Regardless, the statistical significance of the crime index variable leads one to believe 
that crime has a level of effect on Major League Baseball game attendance. The findings of this 
study uncover the hidden costs of crime—costs that may not only be faced by Major League 














Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 14 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol14/iss1/2
REFERENCES:   
Abraham, Itty. 2006. “Primitive Accumulation and Urban Renewal.” Economic and  
Political Weekly 41, no. 15 (April): 1412. 
Advameg Inc. Crime Rates per Year. City Data. Accessed November  
29, 2015.http://www.city-data.com/. 
Ahn, Seung, and Young Lee. 2014. “Major League Baseball Attendance: Long-Term  
Analysis Using Factor Models.” Journal of Sports Economics 15, no. 5 (October): 451-
77. 
Clarke, Byron. 2005. MLB Ticket Revenues per game for 2005. The Cubdom. May 14.  
Accessed November 29, 2015. http://www.thecubdom.com/archives/2005/05/mlb-ticket-
revenues-per-game-for-2005.html. 
Cooke, Steve, and Tom Winfield. 2013. “Crime across the States: Are US Crime Rates  
Converging?” Urban Studies 50, no. 9 (July): 1724-41. 
Davis, Michael. 2009. “Analyzing the Relationship between Team Success and MLB  
Attendance with GARCH Effects.” Journal of Sports Economics 10, no. 1 (February): 
44-58. 
Baumann, Robert, Taylor Ciavarra, Bryan Englehardt, and Victor Matheson. 2012. “ 
Sports Franchises, Events, and City Livability: An Examination of Spectator Sports and 
Crime Rates.” Economic and Labour Relations Review 23, no. 2 (June): 83-97. 
Corman, Hope, and Naci Mocan. 2000. “A Time-Series Analysis of Crime, Deterrence,  
and Drug Abuse in New York City.” American Economic Review 90, no. 3 (June): 584-
604. 
Encina, Eduardo. 2015. Orioles game postponed amid violence, series could be moved.  
17
Jakubek: The Effect of Crime on Major League Baseball Game Attendance
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2017




ESPN. MLB Attendance Report. espn.go.com. Accessed November 29, 2015.  
http://espn.go.com/mlb/attendance 
Fort, Rodney. 2004. “Inelastic Sports Pricing.” Managerial and Decision Economics 25,  
no. 2 (March): 87-94. 
Getz, Vin. 2012. MLB: Average Ticket Prices and Fan Cost Index for All 30 Baseball  
Teams (2008-2012). Sports List of the Day. September 7. Accessed November 29, 
2015.http://sportslistoftheday.com/2012/09/07/mlb-average-ticket-prices-and-fan-cost-
index-for-all-30-baseball-teams-2008-2012/. 
Ingrid Gould, Ellen, and Katherine O'Regan. 2010. “Crime and Urban Flight Revisited:  
The Effect of the 1990s Drop in Crime on Cities.” Journal of Urban Economics 68, no. 3 
(November): 247-59. 
Horowitz, Ira. 2007. “If You Play Well They Will Come: And Vice Versa: Bidirectional  
Causality in Major-League Baseball.” Managerial and Decision Economics 28, no. 2 
(March): 93-105. 
Houston Chronicle. 2008. 2007 average ticket prices ranked by league. Chron. January  
27. Accessed November 29, 2015. http://www.chron.com/sports/article/2007-average-
ticket-prices-ranked-by-league-1787658.php. 
Krautmann, Anthony, and Lawrence Hadley. 2006. “Dynasties versus Pennant Races:  
18
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 14 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol14/iss1/2
Competitive Balance in Major League Baseball.” Managerial and Decision 
Economics 27, no. 4 (June): 287-92. 
Lindholm, Scott. 2015. Baseball attendance trends, 1890-2015--a visual analysis. Beyond  
the Box Score. April 6. Accessed November 29, 
2015.http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2015/4/6/8344399/baseball-attendance-trends-
1890-2015-visual-analysis. 
Machin, Stephen, and Costas Meghir. 2004. “Crime and Economic Incentives.” The  
Journal of Human Resources 39, no. 4: 958-79. 
Pappas, Doug. Year. Business of Baseball Downloadable Data and Documents. Roadside  
Photos. Month Day. Accessed November 29, 
2015. http://roadsidephotos.sabr.org/baseball/data.htm. 
Sweeting, Andrew. 2012. “Dynamic Pricing Behavior in Perishable Goods Markets:  
Evidence from Secondary Markets for Major League Baseball Tickets.” Journal of 
Political Economy 120, no. 6 (December): 1133-72. 
Winfree, Jason. 2004. “Location and Attendance in Major League Baseball.” Applied  
Economics 36, no. 19 (October): 2117-24. 
 
19
Jakubek: The Effect of Crime on Major League Baseball Game Attendance
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2017
